


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### Asia Pride, China Fear, Tokyo Anxiety: Japan Looks Back at Beijing 2008 and Forward to London 2012 and Tokyo 2016

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# Asia Pride, China Fear, Tokyo Anxiety: Japan Looks Back at Beijing 2008 and Forward to London 2012 and Tokyo 2016

William W. Kelly

*The International Olympic Committee (IOC) bidding process has become a long, expensive, bureaucratically complex process among rival cities. However rather than tracing the narrative of competition for the 2016 Summer Games among the four candidate cities – Tokyo, Chicago, Rio de Janeiro, and Madrid, I emphasize here the embeddedness of the Tokyo 2016 bid in East Asian regional politics and in the more subtle if equally contentious jockeying for global city pre-eminence. There was a contentious debate within Japan about the wisdom of Tokyo's bid, which sharply divided the political leadership and the opinion of its citizens. In 1964, Tokyo's hosting of the Games consolidated its place as the single national political, economic and media capital of the country, reducing Osaka to second-city status. To the controversial Tokyo governor and his supporters, the 2016 bid had much less to do with domestic prominence and much more about international prestige, as an effort to preserve Tokyo's status as a global city, a view that was only reinforced by the Beijing Games and by the upcoming 2012 Games in London, Tokyo's rival. If the 1964 Games were Japan's national games, properly held in its capital, I argue that the 2016 Games were to be Tokyo's mega-event, still the national capital but looking beyond to re-assert its status as one of the world's truly global cities.*

The logo of Tokyo's bid for the 2016 Olympics bid was the musubi, a traditional Japanese decorative knot. The design used the five Olympic colours as the strands that fold over to form a simple and colourful knot. The Japanese have long used the musubi to tie up gifts on auspicious and formal occasions and to signify the ties that bind people together. Thus, a Bid Committee press release explained that the musubi logo 'represents Tokyo 2016's mission to unite people young and old

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with sport and healthy living, unite green with 2016, unite the city and the Games, and unite old and new Japan'. [1] This is common rhetorical fare for a Games applicant, although in addition to such public relations sloganeering stressing the domestic benefit, many noticed the aesthetic resemblance of the musubi to the designs of the candidate city logos for Beijing 2008 and London 2012. Unlike the eventual Games logos (the much-admired 'Dancing Beijing' calligraphic figure and London's already-reviled, jagged '2007' logo), Beijing and London used entirely distinct logos when they were candidate cities, both based on flowing ribbons motifs. However unintentional the design similarities, they do remind us just how necessarily attuned an applicant and the candidate city must be to ongoing Games cycles. For Tokyo's 2016 effort, this required a triangulation between the long and fraught Sino-Japanese relationship and the competition between London and Tokyo as global financial centres.

Over the last several decades, the IOC has developed increasingly lengthy and complex procedures that candidate cities for Olympic Games must follow. However rather than tracing this ongoing narrative among what is, in 2009, four anointed candidate cities – Tokyo, Chicago, Rio de Janeiro, and Madrid, I emphasize how the Tokyo 2016 bid was embedded in East Asian regional politics and in the more subtle if equally contentious jockeying for global city pre-eminence.

Recent years have left the Japanese feeling anxious about the balance of power and prestige in both spheres. Japan's reactions to the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing ranged from admiration to anxiety. In part, these decidedly mixed responses were based on the deeply ambivalent Sino-Japanese relationship, which many Japanese leaders feel is replacing the US-Japan relationship as the country's most consequential and problematic bilateral relation. In part, too, Japan responded to the 2008 Beijing Olympics with one eye towards the upcoming Games in London and the other towards its own bid to return the 2016 Summer Games to Tokyo.

Forty-four years after the first Asian Olympic Games in Tokyo, Japan still feels that the region is less than fully acknowledged by the IOC and the Olympic Movement, and the country took satisfaction in a third Asian nation joining the host list. Japanese popular and press coverage of the Opening and Closing Ceremonies in Beijing was glowing, and the architecture and organization of the Games were generally well-reviewed. But the massive economic resources and the oppressive political coordination of the Chinese government drew harsh criticism and stirred deep nervousness about Japan's ability to contend with China's growing clout in the region.

The Beijing Games also immediately became a significant point of contention in Japan's own internal debate about the wisdom of Tokyo's bid for the 2016 Games, which sharply divided the political leadership and citizen opinion. In 1964, Tokyo's hosting of the Games consolidated its place as the single national political, economic, and media capital of the country, reducing Osaka to second-city status. Four decades on, to the controversial Tokyo governor and his supporters, the 2016 bid had much less to do with domestic prominence and much more about international prestige, as

an effort to preserve Tokyo's status as a global city, a view that was only reinforced by the Beijing Games and by the upcoming 2012 Games in London, Tokyo's rival. If the 1964 Games were Japan's national games, properly held in its capital, the 2016 Games were to be Tokyo's mega-event, still the national capital but looking beyond to re-assert its status as one of the world's truly global cities.

*Olympic Time and Scale: Overlapping Temporalities and Intersecting Political Fields*

This contribution, then, places the Tokyo campaign for the 2016 Games in the wider analytic of twenty-first-century Games hosting and global city status. In particular, I want to analyse the forms and motivations of Tokyo's 2016 Games bid from two perspectives that have emerged from Olympic studies. The first is our appreciation of the intricate and extended temporality that has come to shape and entwine the continuing series of Games, and the second is the equally complex interplay of actions and interests at multiple levels of scale and social formation, from the local to the global, in the long Olympic process from bidding to the Games themselves and to their legacy.

First, then, the course of the 2016 Tokyo bid must be understood within an Olympic temporality of extended, overlapping and interpenetrating cycles. There is, to be sure, a formal and cyclical time unit, the quadrennial Olympiad, which the Olympic Movement has tried to impose upon its organizational process, commercial development and sporting agenda since the 1930s. The Beijing Summer Olympics, for instance, are the Games of the XXIXth Olympiad, which in accordance with the Olympic charter (Bye Law to Rule 6) began on 1 January 2008. However, Olympic time is a much more elaborate calendar of events that embed the showcase Games in a longer chronology of requirements and responsibilities. Elsewhere, I have suggested four stages through which all recent Olympics have passed. [2] These four stages are as follows:

- 1) A prehistory that begins with a long bidding campaign (and sometimes several) and that requires creating a rationale, constructing a narrative, and gathering local political, economic and civic support; lobbying the IOC; etc.
- 2) The Games run-up, from previous Closing Ceremony to Opening Ceremony, during which cities and a country are mobilized for massive and intensive infrastructure construction, broadcasting and other commercial rights and forms are developed and marketed, an aesthetic thematic of the Games is created and elaborated, and so on.
- 3) The Games themselves are thus a brief frenetic moment in this long temporal sequence, a concentrated burst whose very compression gives energy and significance; as the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIXth Olympiad (BOG) boasted, 'The world gives us 16 days; we give the world 5,000 years'. Actually, as the IOC heightens the importance of the Paralympics that now follow the Games, it is possible that we will see a more continuous Games unit of four to six weeks.

- 4) The legacies of the Games: all Games continue to exist after the fire is extinguished through the required work of completing and publishing official and unofficial records of the Olympiad (reports, documentaries, etc.), fashioning a retrospective theme and narrative, protecting and burnishing the public memories, and engaging broadly in the culminating project of legacy making. A legacy may be a retrospective refashioning, but the end game of a Games era is a clash of competing legacy making as well as a contentious accounting of the multiple after-effects. [3]

This is of course a generic chronology, and the rhythm, intensity and content of each Games have varied significantly. Nonetheless an important effect of this temporality is to articulate overlapping Games cycles in powerful mutual influence. Competition among Japanese cities for the right to mount a 2016 bid began in 2004, and the Japan IOC settled on Tokyo on 30 August 2006, so plans for the Japan bid were developed even as the Beijing Olympics were being planned and even before the IOC had voted for London in 2012. Developing the Tokyo bid and mobilizing domestic and IOC support continued through to the legacy period of the 'Beijing 2008' era and the run-up period of the 'London 2012' era.

Secondly, the Olympic Movement is a global formation of governance, events and political economy, but when we foreground the global IOC we occlude the several other scales of Olympic activities, agendas and interests. The Olympic Movement is really a crucible of localism, nationalism, regionalism and globalism. Struggles to define and direct Olympic aims, events, properties and agendas take place within and among cities and national sports federations, among nation-states of world regions, and across the IOC membership.

In the case of Japan, the support for its bid was shored up by a national anxiety about the political and economic challenge of its rival East Asian superpower, China. However, the course of the bid was also directed by several powerful domestic concerns as well as Tokyo's concerns about its status as a global city quite apart from its position as the national capital. Indeed, I argue here that the 2016 Games would have been much more the Games of Tokyo than the Games of Japan.

### *Japan Reacts to Beijing 2008*

On many points, the statements by Japanese officials and the coverage by the Japanese media provided the same mixed but generally favourable appraisals as did much of the world commentary about the 2008 Beijing Games. In the run-up to the Games themselves, the Japanese press expressed scepticism over Chinese efforts to control industrial and atmospheric pollution, concern about the politics and protests of the torch relay, muted outrage over the Tibet riots and repression, and unease about restrictions imposed on Beijing and the local residents. Extensive coverage of the Games themselves in Japan also pointedly criticized the continuing harassment of protesters, the fakeries in the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, and the seemingly

restrained and orchestrated enthusiasm of the local citizenry. Nonetheless, these sometimes barbed criticisms were muted by a genuine admiration for the smooth logistical efficiencies of the overall production of the Games and the beauty of architecture and performances that foreground Chinese but more generally East Asian competencies and aesthetics.

There were nonetheless differences across the political spectrum within Japan, which have been astutely analysed by James Farrer. [4] The conservative press, by and large, was harshest on China's management of the Games and on the prospects for any liberalization that might be their legacy. Although awarding Games to facilitate or reward reintegration into the world community has been an IOC objective, the more nationalist of the Japanese press and public intellectuals found the Beijing Games likely to accomplish little of the legacies of the post-Second World War Games in Rome, Tokyo, Munich and Seoul. Farrer concluded, however, that generally the Japanese public reaction was 'more critical and less condescending' than American (and, I would add, European) reactions, largely because of Japanese pessimism about the prospects for political liberalization and sustained economic growth in what is Japan's largest export market. Japanese public opinion and media commentary also tended to see the reason behind China's sloganeering of a 'one hundred year dream' to mount the Olympics. To many Japanese, the phrase was a thinly veiled code for an end to 'one hundred years of national humiliation' and a clear reference to the Western and Japanese aggressions that preceded the PRC era. At the same time, the implied belligerence stirred deep anxieties in Japan about its ability to respond to the growing economy and power of China.

### *The Tokyo 2016 Bid*

Talk of mounting a bid for the Summer Games began with the election of Ishihara Shintarō as governor of metropolitan Tokyo in 1999, following the failure of Osaka, Japan's second city, to make a strong case for host city candidacy. Over the next few years, other Japanese cities expressed interest, although the award of the 2008 Games to Beijing in 2001 quickly discouraged most of their plans. By 2005, only Tokyo and the south-western city of Fukuoka mounted serious cases to the Japan Olympic Committee. The IOC solicited final bids by 30 June 30 2006, and it settled on Tokyo's official candidacy two months later. The IOC voted to accept it as a Candidate City finalist in 2008, along with Chicago, Madrid and Rio de Janeiro.

The Tokyo 2016 Bid Committee had quickly built up its staff, its sponsors and its resources in the early 2000s, pushed by Ishihara, the locally popular but nationally and internationally controversial mayor. It hired the global public relations firm of Weber Shandwick Worldwide, knowing that the company had managed the winning campaigns of Sydney in 2000, Turin in 2006, Beijing in 2008 and Sochi in 2014. And it began to lobby the 26 participating international federations to secure their support for its venue plans.

The Tokyo 2016 Bid Committee's application and subsequent publicity showcased three distinctive features by which it hoped to attract IOC support: a compact scale, the refurbishing of existing facilities and a low environmental impact and energy footprint. Direct comparisons to Beijing were not drawn, but the contrasts were implied. A principal slogan of Tokyo's case was that it would host 'Games at the Heart of City Life'. All of the venues, with the exception of shooting and football, were to be located within an eight-km radius, and most of the venues and support facilities would be along a revitalized waterfront and bay zone just south of the Ginza and the city centre. Twenty-one of the required 31 event venues would be renovations of existing facilities, many of which still exist from the 1964 Olympics. Improvements in downtown road networks are intended to insure a maximum 20-minute commute from the Olympic Village to all venues, largely with a fleet of new low-emission buses that would be worked into the regular municipal fleet. [5]

At the same time, the bid showcased three new major construction projects. A new central stadium was to be designed by Pritzker Architecture Prize winner Tadao Ando and built in the downtown Yoyogi Park; it was intended to have a capacity of 100,000 for the Games and to be refitted afterwards to 80,000, remaining as the main 'legacy building' of the Games. A new Olympic Village of five high-rise buildings is to be constructed along the waterfront, featuring solar and renewable energy systems and total waste recycling, and these would be converted to condominiums after the Games. The third highly touted feature was the renovation of the Dream Island (*Yume no shima*), a large landfill island that the metropolitan government began in the bay in the 1960s to deal with the urban garbage problem. Despite the hopeful name, the landfill has remained something of a municipal headache. The bid plan was to build up the soil with composted organic litter collected from Tokyo public spaces. This would then be planted with almost half a million trees. This 'Forest on the Sea' (*Umi no mori*) was to be the site of canoeing, equestrian and other events and then remain as a vast metropolitan green space for a city that has less park acreage than any other world city.

### *Levels of Play*

In any Games timeline, there is interplay of at least four levels of political and economic interests and ideologies that shape the direction and eventual outcome of bidding and hosting. There are local agendas, nationalist sentiments, regional rivalries and global ambitions. All were on display in the case of Tokyo's efforts to secure the 2016 Games, and the key force that bound the four levels was the agency of a single individual, Tokyo's mayor Shintarō Ishihara.

At the local level, the bid was deeply enmeshed in the political economy of metropolitan development and in the populist bravado of Mayor Ishihara. This is certainly a common motivation in recent Olympic history; Atlanta, for instance, pushed the 1992 Games in part to develop its downtown commercial district and transit system and London is using the 2012 Games as an opportunity to accelerate

the development of its East End Docklands. In the case of Tokyo, its major Tokyo Bay landfill and waterfront zone plans languished for over a decade, and the metropolitan government used the impetus and prestige of the Olympics (as well as national government subsidy commitments of US\$4billion) to bring finally these ambitions to fruition. It also used the Olympics as cover to accomplish two projects that have generated considerable protest – the moving of the world-famous Tsukiji fish market from its waterfront site to make way for an Olympic media centre that would later become an international conference centre and the development of Yoyogi Park, which would include the new Olympic Village and several sports venues, as a transition to permanent housing and recreational facilities.

Yoyogi Park has been a site of enormous political symbolism for over a century. Adjacent to the main shrine to the Emperor Meiji, it was an Imperial Army barracks and parade ground during the early twentieth century. After the Second World War, the US Occupation forces pointedly appropriated it as the Washington Heights complex for American officers' housing. One of the reasons that it was later made the central site of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics was to symbolize Japan's reassuming this central property, symbolized by the Japanese modernist style of the Games buildings designed by Kenzō Tange. Since then, it has been one of Tokyo's few large parks, and protesters of Ishihara's plans were quick to point out the contradictions in the bid plans to reduce the Yoyogi green space while trumpeting the new 'Forest on the Sea'. In these and other issues, then, the Tokyo bid was shaped by – and buffeted by – the local politics of metropolitan development. The identification of the Tokyo Bid Committee with the metropolitan government deliberately sharpened the claims of municipal leadership.

Nonetheless, there was also an effort to create an Olympic narrative with strong nationalist undertones. The current malaise in Japan is wide and deep. It is felt by the most fanatical right-wing militants who rue Japan's pacifism and weak patriotism, by the broad mainstream population who have lost their sense of security and face continuing stagnation, and by progressives on the left, who are gravely concerned about the spectrum of social problems and lack of national political vision. With the collapse of the speculative bubble in 1991, Japan plunged into serial recessions, massive budget deficits, corporate retrenchment, political stasis and social crisis. Bank collapses, executive suicides, teenage rebels, young female 'marriage resisters', 20-something corporate job evaders, and a host of other moral panics have fuelled a potent language of moral decay and social distress. The 1990s were tagged the 'lost decade' but, even after the first decade of the new century the country has yet to find its way out of its collective angst. [6]

Given this, whatever one's place on the political spectrum, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics stands out in national memory as a peak moment of collective accomplishment. Japan's current generation of seniors were the young, dedicated workers of the 1960s, and they have carried through their lives the pride of the nation rising from the material and moral devastation of wartime defeat and mobilizing to produce a mega-event that symbolized domestic resolve, national recovery and



international acceptance. It is obvious that any country would use its Olympic past to give narrative shape and the weight of historical achievement to its present bid. In winning the 2016 Games, Japan would have joined a select circle of countries which have hosted the Summer Games more than once; some even count the 'missing' 1940 Olympics to claim that this would be Japan's third Summer Games, drawing equal to United Kingdom after 2012. But in the case of Tokyo 2016, there was a very particular and very pointed deployment of a rhetoric of 'reviving the 1964 Olympic spirit' in order to resuscitate national confidence and redress the widespread pessimism of the present moment. The strident neo-nationalism of mayor Ishihara is repugnant to many Japanese, but they nonetheless hark back nostalgically to the legacy of 1964 as impetus for a renewal of the same national spirit and international acclaim.

Of course, much of the nationalist sentiment that fuelled Japanese supporters was embedded in the long-term and contemporary rivalries in East Asia – vis-à-vis China, but also in response to the serious tensions on the Korean peninsula. At least since the 1950s, when the IOC confronted the two-China issue, the politics of East Asia have been played out in the Olympic Movement. Although it is often said that the East Asian countries have only recently been given proper standing and importance in the Olympic Movement, it has long been the world region that most directly confronts the IOC with the fundamentally political nature of its mission. As national entities, as national sports federations, and as host cities, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China and Taiwan have been locked in a wary embrace, allies in their quest for Olympic parity, but often bitter rivals in their competition for Olympic acknowledgement and prestige. Thus, the Tokyo Bid Committee was at pains to distinguish its application from the just concluded Games even as it appealed to the growing significance of East Asia as a region, economically and ideologically, in the IOC's vision of the Olympic future. In the application materials and in its public rhetoric, the Tokyo 2016 Bid Committee carefully balanced emphasizing those features of aesthetic beauty, organizational efficiency, and commercial potential that are associated with East Asia with distancing its case from the repressive measures and felt artifice of the previous East Asian Games in Beijing.

Finally, there was a global scale to the nearly decade-long quest to bring the Olympics to Tokyo, and it pertained much more to the city's anxieties than Japan's felt dilemma. Since Saskia Sassen coined the term 'global city' in her 1991 book and anointed New York, London and Tokyo as her three archetypes, the metropolis has seen itself as both national capital and global node. [7] Despite (or perhaps because) of the irony of its designation just at the moment when its status as a global financial centre was undermined by Japan's own economic collapse, Tokyo has invested heavily in protecting its status.

Since Sassen formulated the concept of global city as the world's core hubs of economic, political, cultural, and information producers and transducers, there have been numerous efforts to refine the concept and sharpen the metrics by which cities might be rated. In 2008, the editors of *Foreign Policy* commissioned Sassen and other scholars and consultants to develop a multi-variant scaling of global cities, with

24 metrics in five broad categories. [8] In the initial index, Tokyo was ranked fourth behind New York, London and Paris, and it held its place above Hong Kong, Los Angeles, Singapore and Seoul largely because of its second-place rank in business services. In other categories of human capital, cultural experience and information exchange, it lagged behind, and this was a crucial reason that it had invested so much in its campaign to host the Olympics. Despite much public and private investment in integrated commercial, cultural and residential complexes like Ark Hills, Tokyo's global profile has remained decidedly one-dimensional, and with its financial services and banking industries under severe duress and retrenchment, the Olympic Games would have been a unique opportunity to reshape and broaden Tokyo's image. [9]

What articulated all four of these levels at which the Tokyo 2016 bid was motivated and shaped was the complex and controversial figure of metropolitan Tokyo's mayor. Shintarō Ishihara has been in the public limelight for over half a century. [10] Born in 1932, he is a member of Japan's first generation to come of age after the wartime defeat, the most important generation in setting the tone and establishing the terms of public debates in Japan for much of the last five decades. And Ishihara has been in the thick of many of them. He moved in bohemian literary circles in college, and he electrified the country in 1956, as he was graduating, when he was awarded the Akutagawa Literary Prize, the country's premier prize for new authors. The film from the novel, *The Season of the Sun* turned him into a Norman Mailer-esque celebrity. By the late 1960s, however, he turned conservative and nationalistic, and began a 25-year career as politician in the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). He gained international notoriety in the late 1980s for his xenophobic attacks on the United States, most famously in the 1989 polemic he wrote with Sony chief executive officer (CEO) Akio Morita, *The Japan That Can Say No*, a high-handed claim of Japanese superiority. [11] He continues to offend China with his occasional use of the derogatory term 'Shina' from the Japanese imperial era.

He left the LDP in 1995, disgusted with what he saw as weakness and cronyism, and in 1999 pulled off a surprising victory as mayor of metropolitan Tokyo. He continues to be stridently nationalistic, attending ceremonies for the Japanese war dead at the infamous Yasukuni Shrine, ordering the flying of the national flag and singing of the national anthem in Tokyo schools, and regularly issuing inflammatory statements couched in discriminatory language about foreigners in Tokyo. Nonetheless, he has been re-elected twice and remains quite popular with a metropolitan citizenry that has tired of political gridlock at the national level, even when they find Ishihara himself to be an unpalatable alternative. Nonetheless, his ability to move the Tokyo 2016 bid along the four separate registers of the local, the national, the regional and the global, and to construct a narrative for hosting the Games that draws strategically from rationales of all four bound local interests and co-opted national authorities into supporting a risky and costly objective.

My analytical claim may appear to place too much significance on a single individual (however publicly known), his biography (however extensive), and his

politics (however inflammatory), but it does account for the surprising support that the bid sustained. It is also a strong demonstration of the high degree of mutual contingency across the overlapping cycles of Games sponsorship. Without Beijing 2008 and London 2012 developing in the ways that they have through the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is hard to imagine that the Tokyo bid could have reached the candidate stage.

## **Conclusion**

On 20 October 2009, the full IOC membership met in Copenhagen for a vote on the 2016 Games host city. The final lobbying was frenetic. The Japanese crown prince, the Spanish King, the Brazilian president, and the US president all made personal presentations to the IOC. President Obama's speech was the first time that a sitting US president has made a personal appeal. The decision was remarkably quick. On the first ballot, Chicago was eliminated, on the second ballot Tokyo was eliminated, and on the third ballot, Rio overwhelmingly defeated Madrid.

In hindsight, Tokyo's bid was problematic from the start, at least to outside observers, and important developments since the conclusion of the Beijing Olympic Games only widened the discrepancies between Tokyo's advantages and its disadvantages. The Japanese economy deteriorated much faster than any of the other major economies during 2008–09, and this weakened domestic support for hosting the Games, undermined corporate investment capabilities and perhaps shook IOC confidence in Tokyo's ability to live up to its plans. [12] At the same time, Tokyo was seen by some IOC members to be the safest bet because it was the candidate city with the most of the necessary infrastructure already in place for the Games. Furthermore, because the Japanese government long employed a fiscal policy of stimulating recessionary periods with public works expenditures, it would have been more willing to make up shortfalls in private investment with national and metropolitan budget expenditures. Indeed, in early February 2009, on the eve of the deadline for the four candidate cities to submit final plans, the Japanese government pledged US\$4 bn to insure completion of the facilities.

From the perspective of IOC geopolitics, the sequence of Sydney 2000, Athens 2004, Beijing 2008 and London 2012 led prevailing wisdom to assume that the 2016 Games must be in the Americas – either Chicago in the north or Rio de Janeiro in the south. In the final vote, the opportunity to bring the Summer Games to South America for the first time overrode concerns about safety and infrastructure in Rio.

Ishihara and Tokyo's economic elite made very different geopolitical calculations. Still the Tokyo governor, Ishihara is seriously considering renewing the city's bid for the next Games in 2020. Beijing 2008 and London 2012 seriously challenged Tokyo's self-image, its position as the pre-eminent East Asian city, and its place in the firmament of core global cities. Tokyo is retaining its place in the top five global cities only by the strength of its financial activity, and the present world economic crisis continues to erode its comparative advantage. To many in Tokyo, the prestige of the

Summer Games mega-event is the last best chance to reassert its claims. By staking much more metropolitan than national prestige on the outcome of the IOC decision and by ceding so much of the initiative and exposure to the headstrong and mercurial mayor, bid supporters of metropolitan Tokyo gambled that the potential gains at the local and global levels would justify the enormous risks at the national and regional levels. They may make that gamble again.

## Notes

- [1] Tokyo 2016 Olympic Games Bid Committee, Vol. 1, 16.
- [2] Kelly, 'Beijing 2008'.
- [3] See Mangan and Dyreson, *Olympic Legacies*.
- [4] Farrer, 'One Bed, Different Dreams'.
- [5] Details of these plans are provided in Tokyo 2016 Olympics Games Bid Committee, *Tokyo 2016 Olympics Games Application*.
- [6] Leheny, *Think Global, Fear Local*; Yoda and Harootunian, *Japan after Japan*.
- [7] Sassen, *The Global City*.
- [8] 'The 2008 Global Cities Index'.
- [9] Machimura, 'Mega ibento to toshi kūkan'; Iwabuchi, 'Lost in TransNation'.
- [10] Nathan, *Japan Unbound*, 169–202; Sherif, 'The Aesthetics of Speed'.
- [11] Ishihara and Morita, *The Japan That Can Say No*.
- [12] 'Early in, Early Out: An Economy Not Hit Directly by the Financial Storm Is Shrinking Much Faster than Any Other Developed One', *The Economist*, 24 Jan. 2009, 80–1.

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